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ABSTRACT 
The economic crisis and the threat of default have had significant 
repercussions on the Greek political system. The handling of the 
crisis by the new PASOK government has led to a new political and 
has added new problems to the party system. The purpose of this 
paper is twofold: First, to trace the course and the causes that led to 
the present day crisis by pinpointing the major socioeconomic and 
political developments that paved the way to the crisis. Second, it 
seeks to explore the political management or mismanagement of the 
crisis, to identify the strategies of the main political actors, and to 
assess the problems facing the Greek political system. It is argued 
that apart from the obvious economic crisis, Greece is undergoing a 
protracted and serious political crisis. 
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Greek Politics in the Era of Economic Crisis: 
Reassessing Causes and Effects 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Greece has often attracted international attention though not always because of 
the country’s achievements. In 1974 it was the fall of the seven year 
dictatorship and the establishment of the Third Greek republic and the 
subsequent development of a stable and consolidated democratic political 
system. In 1981 it was the rise in power of the socialist party (PASOK) that 
attracted much discussion; PASOK dominated the Greek political scene during 
the eighties and the nineties and its controversial performance became the 
subject of scientific analysis and debate (Clogg 1991, Lyrintzis 1993 and 2005, 
Spourdalakis and Tassis, 2006). The 2004 Olympic games provided an 
opportunity for positive comments. By contrast, Greece  attracted attention in 
December 2008 when, at the beginning of the economic crisis, the Athens riots 
expressed the, thus far, latent frustration and resentment of the Greek youth. 
Last but not least, during the last two years Greece achieved notoriety not as a 
tourist destination but as a country at the brink of bankruptcy, and a member of 
the family of PIGS. The economic crisis and the possibility to default became 
much discussed topics both in the media and in the academic circles. The 
current debate concerns both the causes of the current predicament and the 
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effectiveness of the adopted course of action. The purpose of this paper is 
twofold: First, to trace the course and the causes that led to the present day 
crisis by pinpointing the major socioeconomic and political developments that 
paved the way to the crisis. Second, it seeks to explore the political 
management or mismanagement of the crisis, to identify the strategies of the 
main political actors, and to assess the problems facing the Greek political 
system. It is argued that apart from the obvious economic crisis, Greece is 
undergoing a protracted and serious political crisis. It is a crisis whose effects 
are partly evident today, but which works in latent manner underneath the 
apparently normal surface of Greek politics. The goal is to explore the content 
and the dimensions of this crisis.  
 
2. Partitocrazia and “bureaucratic clientelism” 
The causes of the present situation go back to the past decades and have to do 
with much discussed questions as the fiscal profligacy of the Greek state, 
clientelism and corruption, the populist practices of the Greek political parties, 
the inefficiency of  the state machine and last but not least with  the 
institutional and political problems within the EU and the euro -zone. Whether 
the reforms implemented under the pressure of the economic crisis will help to 
remedy some of these problems is an open question. What follows is an attempt 
to evaluate the impact of these factors and to assess the problems and 
weaknesses of the Greek political system during the last thirty five years. 
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The political system established after the fall of the junta has been dominated 
by the antagonism between the two major political parties, New Democracy 
(ND) and PASOK representing the centre right and the centre left respectively. 
The party system was complemented by the communist left (KKE) as well as 
by minor parties, which, with the notable exception of Synaspismos (a left-
wing party originally formed as a splinter group of the KKE), all proved 
stillborn. Both ND and PASOK  were new political formations with 
considerable links however with the pre junta political system. Despite the 
impressive renewal of the political personnel and the development of a mass 
base the new political parties proved worthy heirs of the legacy of the past, 
namely clientelism. Patronage and clientele networks have marked Greek 
politics since the creation of the modern Greek state and have been used as 
major analytical tools for the study and interpretation of the Greek political 
parties. During the last thirty five years the two major parties reinvented and 
reorganized the patronage networks through the use and abuse of their mass 
party organizations which were exploited in order to penetrate the state 
machine as well as the organized interests and parts of civil society.1 
Irrespective of the term used to describe the new system of clientelism 
(bureaucratic clientelism, party statism, or machine politics), the fact is that the 
voters’ loyalty benefits the party rather than individual politicians and the party 
                                                 
1
 Pappas and Asimakopoulou (2011) have produced a detailed study of the ways in which the parties 
have exploited their power to reinforce and expand their patronage networks in the different levels of 
the wider public sector; their study has also illuminated the role of political entrepreneurs that thrive 
inside the two major parties.  
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in turn allocates favours through its organization to both individual voters and 
to collective groups (Lyrintzis 1984, Mavrogordatos 1997, Pappas 2011). 
Two major developments facilitated and enhanced the development and 
reproduction of this system. First, the Greek party system, despite the presence 
of minor parties, functioned as a typical two-party system especially since 
PASOK’s victory in 1981. The alternation of the two major parties in power 
led to political polarization and after each governmental change to massive 
allocation of favours to the party’s clientele. Second, the expansion of the 
Greek state during the last three decades of the twentieth century almost in all 
areas of public life has been the outcome and at the same time the motive for 
the extensive structure of patronage politics in Greece. The tradition of state 
centralism and of the extreme politicization of the bureaucracy continued in a 
renewed and intense manner in the post junta period. The often irrational 
growth of the public sector was the result of both PASOK’s attempt to create a 
welfare state and of the subsequent strategy of the major political parties to 
create new public structures – universities, hospitals, new administrative 
services and public agencies, research centres – on the basis of electoral rather 
than rational economic/functional criteria. This party strategy brings into the 
discussion the much debated concept of populism and its use in Greek politics 
(Lyrintzis 1987 and 2005, Pantazopoulos 2006). For the purposes of this paper 
let us only note that one aspect of the populist logic is the adoption and 
implementation of policies on the basis of electoral and narrow party criteria; 
by claiming that a policy is beneficial to the people, the political parties 
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succumbed to the particularistic demands of the party base and/or specific 
clientele groups and introduced policies that were to have in the future severe 
negative implications for Greece.  The end result was an oversized and over 
crowded public sector subservient to the political parties whose size kept 
increasing until the beginning of the twenty first century.2 
 By using state channels and state recourses the political parties were able to 
penetrate and often to control almost all areas of public life including the 
organized interests (Lavdas 1997 and 2005), the civil service (Sotiropoulos 
2001), local and regional authorities and the universities. The latter provide an 
illuminating and probably unique example of how party competition was 
transferred into the students unions – as it is the case with trade unions – which 
are organized explicitly along party lines. Moreover, the number of universities 
increased from 6 in the seventies to 23 at the beginning of the twenty first 
century, thus creating departments all over Greece with serious problems and 
often with no demand from the students. Even the private sector developed 
close links with the parties as private entrepreneurs sought assistance from 
party and state mechanisms to secure loans, business licences and lucrative 
deals (Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos 2010, pp.41-258). It is characteristic that all 
private big media corporations in Greece depend on the state for their licences 
and for advertisement profits. 
                                                 
2
 There are many studies of the role, development and overgrowth of the Greek state. An excellent 
summary of its growth and of the relevant interpretations is offered by Iordanoglou (2010).  
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It can be argued, therefore, that the terms “partitocrazia” and “bureaucratic 
clientelism” accurately describe the functioning of the Greek political system. 
There is of course a debate both about the analytical terms and the substance of 
the argument: namely, is it the parties or the state that has the upper hand in this 
situation? It can be argued that during the seventies and eighties the parties 
were powerful actors able to influence policies and socioeconomic 
developments in all areas. In the nineties, and especially under PM Simitis, 
state mechanisms expanded and new responsibilities were added to old or 
newly created state agencies. This movement can be seen as an attempt by the 
Simitis modernizers’ team to outflank the power of the party’s (PASOK) base 
(Kazamias, 2005). In other words it was the control of, or access to state 
mechanisms that secured the power position of specific persons or groups. Yet, 
despite its expansion and power the Greek state was at the same time weak and 
fragmented, a victim of its own role and responsibilities, “a colossus with feet 
of clay” (Sotiropoulos, 1993). Moreover, it has to be noted that the Greek state 
was never much bigger than its European counterparts (Iordanoglou, 2010). 
The percentage of the public sector employees among the whole population 
was always close to the European average. It was the way it functioned 
therefore that caused significant problems.      
There are several major implications from the situation described above. First, 
political parties have been held responsible for all the problems confronting 
Greece today (Mouzelis, 2005). Patronage and corruption, the inefficiency of 
the public sector, the weakness of civil society and eventually the huge foreign 
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debt of the country are associated with the manner political parties performed 
and with their special relationship with the state aimed at satisfying their own 
interests. It is true that political parties failed to establish and develop a 
democratic internal functioning that would integrate them with their social base 
without the intervention of patronage networks. They leaned on the state and 
abused it as political entrepreneurs who subsumed the general to the party 
interest; thus they had the leading role in creating the image of a political 
system riddled with graft, bribery and corruption. It is the dominance of this 
image that led to today’s endless allegations and recriminations between the 
political parties about the involvement and guilt of their members in economic 
scandals. 
It has to be stressed, however, that although there is much truth in the above 
image, this does not mean that all Greek political personnel was corrupt and 
subservient to patronage networks. It could be said that the majority of the 
political elite did not accept bribes nor was involved in political and economic 
scandals. Moreover, a situation like this is not Greek exclusivity. Italy provides 
a very similar case where despite the serious efforts to combat corruption the 
results were poor (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2007).  
A second major effect of the above situation has been the repeated failure of 
reforms in Greece. In fact, during the last twenty years Greece witnessed a 
series of ill-fated and/or ineffective reforms in all areas including education, 
transport, health, the labour market, local government and the social security 
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system. The question “why reforms fail in Greece” became a central one in 
social sciences and gradually a significant literature has been produced on this 
issue.3 The complex relationship between parties, the state and the fruitless 
process of reforms in Greece became particularly evident and acute during the 
first decade of the twenty first century. 
 
3. A Critical Decade  
As the new century began Greece was in the middle of the political project of 
“modernization” introduced by Prime Minister Simitis and his team (Lyrintzis, 
2005). The socio-political climate was positive and the prospects of economic 
development were good: Greece was ready to join the EMU and preparations 
for the 2004 Olympic games were under way. Yet the government’s attempt to 
“cut the Gordian knot of pension reform” failed miserably having caused the 
most massive demonstrations Athens had seen for a long time (Tinios 2005). 
The same fate had attempts to reform transport, the higher education, health 
and the labour market. The endless list of ill-fated reforms shows firstly the 
limited degree of success of Simitis’ modernization project and secondly, the 
effectiveness and power acquired by party and organized interests groups. The 
latter had to support their interests and therefore opposed any attempt to reduce 
the role of the state and to rationalize public services, as this would mean loss 
of benefits and the undermining of their power position. As it will be discussed 
                                                 
3
 The volume edited by Featherstone (2005), “The challenge of Modernization: Politics and Policy in 
Greece”, contains articles on the sad story of reform in three critical areas, namely the labour market, 
pensions and health. See also Featherstone and Papadimitriou, (2008) and Pelagidis (2005).  
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below, it was only under the pressure of the economic crisis that it was possible 
to introduce sustainable reforms in all the above mentioned areas. The failure to 
reform the public sector was a major factor for the electorate’s growing 
resentment and frustration with the Simitis government; the majority of the 
citizens felt that the government had failed to improve their every day life and 
especially to improve the citizen’s relations with the state. On top of that there 
were allegations about economic scandals involving some leading PASOK 
members. The New Democracy party was quick to grasp the opportunity and 
started a long pre-electoral campaign based on the pledge to reorganize the 
state (the re-foundation of the state was the main party slogan), to end the 
clientelistic practices of PASOK and to introduce transparency and a new 
morality in the political life of the country. The March 2004 election gave a 
landslide victory to the New Democracy party which returned to power after 
eleven years in opposition.     
Once in office, the New Democracy government, despite the impressive public 
opinion support it enjoyed for at least three years, did not manage to fulfil its 
pre-electoral promises. No major reforms were introduced, appointments to the 
public sector continued as in the past, public expenditure increased while 
public revenues decreased and the deficit kept increasing to reach the 
unprecedented level of 15% of the GDP in 2009.4 The measures taken by the 
government once the 2008 global economic crisis was evident can be described 
                                                 
4
  It must be noted that when ND left office the official figure was 5.4% ; at the time the Bank of 
Greece was projecting it at 10%. Officially, as approved by the Eurostat, the deficit figure for 2009 is 
15,4%. 
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as a too little too late attempt to protect the vulnerable Greek economy 
(Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos, 2009). After five and a half years in office, and 
after having won a second parliamentary election in 2007, the New Democracy 
government was forced to call for an early election in September 2009 amidst 
allegations for several economic scandals. It was obvious that the economic 
crisis was imminent and that Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis was not willing 
to continue in office and confront the implications.  
It can be said that the first decade of the twenty first century was a “lost 
decade”, in the sense that a very good opportunity to introduce reforms and to 
reverse the course leading to bankruptcy had been lost. The two major Greek 
parties both failed to take the necessary initiatives and proved inferior to the 
task they had promised to fulfil. What is more important is that Greek society 
was not prepared or informed about the risk of an economic crisis. Significant 
cultural changes had taken place during this decade which led to complacency 
and indifference. 
During the last decade all major surveys including the European Social Survey 
(ESS, 2003) registered increasing percentages of political apathy, distrust of the 
political parties and a disenchantment with politics. It is not surprising 
therefore, that Greek society followed the political and economic development 
with embarrassment yet without showing any clear willingness for change. The 
three decades of populist and clientelistic practices had managed to diffuse an 
apolitical discourse that breeds atomization and political alienation. The idea 
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that it is easy to acquire quick and easy profits provided one has the right 
contacts and the necessary access to the state mechanisms became dominant in 
Greek society. This meant an explicit or implicit acceptance of the clientelistic 
system which large sections of the population tried to exploit. The end result 
was a curious and dangerous mixture of political distrust and alienation with 
the widespread attitude that the system could be used to extract personal or 
collective favours and spoils. The economic crisis came as a shock to the Greek 
society which was forced to realize in a very short period of time that old 
certainties were undermined and old practices had to be abandoned.  
 
4. The Advent of a Foretold Crisis 
A few words should be said about the uses and abuses of the term crisis. The 
economic use of the term is rather clear as it refers to the fiscal and sovereign 
debt crisis of the Greek state. The political use is much more complicated as it 
may refer to a legitimacy crisis, to a governmental crisis or to the crisis of the 
political parties. In any case the term is ambiguous and vague and one has to 
clarify and determine the criteria according to which the crisis is defined. 
Otherwise the term simply refers to a vague and undefined problem. In the 
following pages an attempt is being made to clarify the criteria and the context 
in which we may speak of political crisis or of the political parties’ crisis. 
The PASOK government that emerged from the September 2009 election was 
aware of Greece’s fiscal problems. Even if the Prime Minister (George 
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Papandreou) was not fully informed, it should not take more than a month to 
grasp the full extend of the problem. Yet the government was very slow in its 
reactions and avoided taking drastic measures. During the electoral campaign 
no party acknowledged the seriousness of the situation nor was it ever stated 
that the country was at the brink of bankruptcy. It has been argued that it was 
the new government’s  procrastination that led the spreads to unprecedented 
high rates. Irrespective of the responsibility of the new PASOK government the 
fact is that it was only at the beginning of 2010 that a serious package of 
economic measures was announced. The delay may be attributed to political 
and communication considerations as it was thought that public opinion was 
not prepared for the draconian measures that were to follow. Moreover, 
PASOK’s pre-electoral pledges were different. Of course Papandreou acted the 
way Greek political leaders did before: He accused the previous government of 
leaving a mess which his government had to clean up. It is not within the scope 
of this paper to assess the role of the New Democracy government during the 
2004-09 period in exacerbating the foreign debt and thus facilitating the way to 
the economic crisis. Certainly its performance played a crucial role and this is 
what the majority of the electorate expressed in the 2009 election. 
Having realized the extent of the problem, the government finally decided to 
rely on the IMF and the EU and to negotiate a plan to save the Greek economy. 
The process resulted in Greece’s acceptance in May 2010 of the terms of the 
IMF, which together with the EU and the ECB (the so-called Troika), secured 
the financing of the Greek  economy for the next three years under the terms of 
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a memorandum that was voted by the Greek parliament. It has been said that 
Greece’s bargaining position was extremely difficult. This may be true, but it is 
equally plausible to argue that the Prime Minister could have negotiated better 
terms; moreover it has been argued that he could have blackmailed his 
European partners who had significant reasons to keep Greece alive and in the 
euro zone. Leaving aside the speculation about the possible scenarios, the fact 
is that in May 2010 Greece accepted a complex agreement, which ended the 
country’s capacity to decide on its fiscal policy and provided for a large 
number of harsh measures in almost all areas of social and economic life. The 
implications will be further discussed below. First let us examine the strategy 
of the Greek political parties. 
 
5. Party Strategy  
Two crucial decisions define the PASOK’s government strategy during the first 
year in office. First, the government decided to confront the crisis relying 
exclusively on its own forces and refusing any kind of cooperation or alliance 
with the other political forces. While admitting that the situation was close to a 
state of emergency, the government did not seek the creation of a broader 
political front to cope with it. Papandreou and his government accepted the task 
to save the country from default and, despite the delays, proceeded to a range 
of unprecedented economic measures that seriously and indiscriminately hit the 
middle and lower strata of Greek society. At the same time Papandreou failed 
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to put pressure on the opposition parties in order to clarify their positions and 
policy plans on the crisis: the government was thus easily accused by all 
opposition parties that it had easily accepted the IMF’s harsh terms. It may be 
true that the government could have negotiated better terms in the 
memorandum; with a broader political support behind him, Papandreou might 
have achieved better results. However, the point is not the slightly better or 
worse terms but the fact that there is no guarantee that after the year 2012 
Greece will be able to go to the markets and to proceed with a sustainable 
economy. In other words the government has nothing to say and in fact did say 
nothing about the day after. It is characteristic of the uncertainty and 
opaqueness regarding the future that since the beginning of 2011 there has been 
recurrent discussion about the renegotiation of the terms of the loan and the 
need for a new austerity programme for the post – memorandum period. It 
remains to be seen how this extension of the memorandum will be 
implemented. 
The second major decision was to set up parliamentary investigating 
committees which would investigate the so called scandals of the previous 
government. (Chief among them the Vatopedi scandal involving accusations of 
bribes for land swaps between the church and the Greek state and the Siemens 
scandal involving mainly PASOK ministers who received money from the 
company either as bribes or as donations to the party). It is true that a number 
of scandals topped the political agenda during the last years involving both the 
PASOK and the ND governments; yet, past experience shows that 
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parliamentary investigations never resulted in naming any minister as 
responsible for a specific crime and thus to proceed with the legal procedure at 
the special High Court. The relevant legislation about the penal persecution of 
cabinet members has plenty of loopholes and it is well known that such 
parliamentary committees never reach any definite conclusions. (In the 
Vatopedi case the committee did conclude its work by proposing legal action 
against several New Democracy and few PASOK former ministers and the 
parliament voted for their persecution; as expected, however, the ministers 
have been acquitted by a court decision due to legal – procedural problems). 
 The investigation of economic scandals by parliamentary committees increases 
the polarization of the political system, undermines the prospects of political 
alliances and disorients public opinion leading to political gossip and fruitless 
discussions about political morality. Above all, however, the functioning of 
these committees blurs the political confrontation and leads to personal 
antagonisms and unnecessary political turmoil. The popular demand for justice 
and transparency could be better served through the normal institutional 
channels of the judiciary and the independent authorities. The parliamentary 
investigation of scandals created a political climate marked by allegations and 
mutual recriminations between the two major parties. The leader of the 
opposition party, Mr Samaras (who succeeded Kostas Karamanlis at the party 
leadership after the 2009 elections), recently stated that his party will ask for a 
special committee to investigate how Greece arrived at the brink of bankruptcy 
and the responsibilities of the Papandreou government in handling the crisis 
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and in drafting the terms of the memorandum. It is an odd proposal in the sense 
that for the first time there will be an investigation about political decisions. 
The end result is that in the middle of an unprecedented economic crisis and 
hard economic measures political parties operate and quarrel as if it is 
business as usual. They try to obscure the fact that they form the same political 
elite that ruled the country for the last 35 years. One can speak of a political 
crisis as well as of crisis of the political parties. Clearly, the Greek case bears 
no resemblance to that of Ireland, where despite party antagonisms there has 
been a clear attempt to achieve the wider possible consensus on the 
management of the crisis. 
 
6. Defining the Crisis 
What happened in Greece during the last year bears all the characteristics of a 
“state of emergency”. How else can one describe a situation in which the state 
is virtually bankrupt, sovereignty on fiscal policy has been lost, pensions and 
salaries have been severely reduced primarily in the public and also in the 
private sector resulting in a drastic deterioration of the economic conditions for 
the majority of the population. 
The political scene is further complicated by the paradoxical situation of the 
PASOK government: PASOK implements an unprecedented austerity policy of 
neo-liberal flavour, which not only contradicts the party’s ideological profile 
and pre-electoral pledges, but, and this is more important, it contradicts the 
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party’s whole historical course and past political practice. Greek society was 
taken aback by this wave of changes and follows developments with justified 
insecurity and embarrassment, unconvinced about the effectiveness of the new 
economic policy. The government and the PM present their policy as the 
outcome of a state of emergency and on several occasions have explicitly stated 
that they adopt measures they don’t agree with. As they put it: “It is the 
memorandum or default”. This development has led to a radical realignment of 
the traditional cleavages in Greek politics: The traditionally dominant old Left-
Right cleavage has been substituted or complemented by the new one: for or 
against the memorandum, which means PASOK on the one hand and all other 
parties on the other. It is interesting, if not ironic, that the New Democracy 
party concurs with the Left in opposing the memorandum. Under its new leader 
it follows a short-sighted populist strategy. The party did not vote for the 
memorandum and blames the government for its harsh terms, declaring that the 
party has elaborated an apparently magic plan that will reduce Greece’s debt in 
a two year period. Thus we have the paradox a liberal party opposing a liberal 
set of measures in an obvious attempt to differentiate itself from the 
government and to present a positive image to the electorate. Above all it is a 
strategy aimed at saving the two parties’ dominance in Greek politics for the 
last 35 years. It is doubtful whether ND will be able to convince the electorate 
given the blatant failure of the ND government during the 2004-09 period. The 
party has adopted a comprehensive condemnation of every act of the 
government, a fact that undermines its credibility and creates the image of an 
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old fashioned opposition with populist practices. This strategy of the ND party 
is partly explained by the presences of a far Right party (LAOS) which has 
initially voted for the memorandum but ever since is equally critical of both 
ND and PASOK 
On the Left side of the political spectrum the Greek Left is in an awkward 
position characterized by introversion and fragmentation. The traditional 
communist party (KKE) follows a consistent anti-European and anti-euro 
position – without clarifying of course the possible effects of the country’s exit 
from the euro and the EU. The other political groups of the left, Synaspismos 
and Democratiki Aristera (Democratic Left, a splinter group from 
Synaspismos) are restricted to an unqualified opposition to the memorandum 
and to the old type rhetoric against capitalism. Though the share of the vote of 
KKE rose in the recent local government elections, the overall appeal of the 
Left remains stagnant.  
It is an interesting question why in a period of economic crisis and austerity the 
ideas of the Left about equality, social justice and solidarity do not succeed to 
appeal to the masses. One possible explanation of this apparently paradoxical 
situation is that the political agents of the Left are not competent and 
convincing representatives of the ideals of the Left. A second explanation has 
to do with the ideological defeat of the Left at the wider European level: the 
Left has not managed so far to confront the dominant liberal ideology about the 
prevalence of the market and the related view that a small State and free 
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competition provide the solution to all problems. On top of that the major 
problem of the Greek Left is that it has not managed to translate the general 
values about equality, justice and solidarity into a concrete and coherent 
programmatic discourse which could attract the electorate. The vague 
proclamation of the necessity for socialist change is not convincing anymore.   
The Greek Left suffers from the same problems facing its European 
counterparts; namely, lack of inspiration, imagination, and finally vision. It is 
very difficult to construct a political discourse with several concrete and 
appealing propositions that could be perceived by the electorate as possible 
solutions to existing problems. Hence it is limited to a sterile and old fashioned 
discourse while at the same time it is engaged in endless discussions about 
which agent is the best and sincere representative of the Left. It is perhaps high 
time that the Left will abandon the pathless search for the right agent as well as 
the search for the revolutionary subject. The much sought-after unity and 
appeal of the Left can be achieved by designing new common actions, by 
attracting movement organizations and by creating front line resistance themes 
that may attract massive support. All these of course presuppose the 
abandonment of personal ambitions and group antagonisms. This situation 
reveals the more general problem regarding the crisis of the political parties.  
The major element defining the crisis of the political parties is their inability to 
articulate and present a coherent and concrete set of proposals – policies which 
can offer solutions to existing problems. Indeed Greek political parties run out 
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of ideas, they lack concrete policies and above all they have no vision for the 
future. Political parties are therefore limited to the management of everyday 
politics. In fact they present their ability to provide better management as their 
major asset; management, administration and deliberation are the key words in 
their political discourse. Of course these are positive and important elements in 
the parties’ agenda, but this is not enough as they do not offer a vision for the 
day after.  It is not surprising, therefore, to register attitudes of alienation, 
cynicism and distrust towards not only the government but the political parties 
as well. One has to accept of course that some of the reforms introduced by the 
PASOK government were overdue. However, the rapid rate of economic and 
social change increases instability and the social cost. It is interesting to note 
that so far the only reason to reform is to fulfil the terms of the memorandum, 
which is widely seen as imposed by the Troika. But in order for change to take 
hold the government and the political parties have to come up with their own 
project for the economy and the future. Such a project simply does not exist. 
The country’s political elite has been thoroughly discredited because of its 
performance during the last years and it is very difficult for the PASOK 
government to instil trust to the existing political institutions. 
It is important to note, that after the initial shock and embarrassment due to the 
draconian measures announced by the government, Greek society began to 
show signs of reaction and political mobilization. The often demonstrations 
organized by the trade unions and the organized interest groups reached a peak 
in May 2010 (when three bank employees died when their offices took fire 
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during a demonstration); such demonstrations continue to take place without 
however attracting massive support. What is more important is the awakening 
civil society with the emergence of non partisan “civilian” movements and 
face-book organized demonstrations. The most prominent action comes from 
the so-called “Den plirono” (I don’t pay) movement; it is a movement that 
refuses payment of tolls at Greece’s under construction or in very poor 
condition national roads, and more recently refusal to pay the Athens public 
transport fares which have increased by 40%.  Although the parties of the Left 
swiftly endorsed these actions, their organization and development was not 
party controlled. The government was quick to codemn this movement as 
irresponsible, illegal and one that creates a climate of anomie in the country. 
Irespective of the manner in which one politically evaluates such action, the 
fact is that we have the emergence of a civil disobedience movement in Greece. 
This movement can be seen as an expression of social dissatisfaction and 
frustration caused by the severe measures introduced by a government which 
had no clear mandate to do so. In this sense it is a clear manifestation of a 
legitimacy crisis whose effects are difficult to foresee. 
 
7. A  Crisis of the Political (?) 
In the current socioeconomic context Greek politics revolve around the 
dilemma ”memorandum or default” advanced by the government. Irrespective 
of the manner one reacts to the above dilemma, the point is that by focusing on 
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the management of the crisis one misses the fact that we are also confronted 
with a political crisis with unforeseen effects. The parties do not generate a 
discussion about the future development of Greek society and politics. The lack 
of a serious debate as well as the lack of a confrontation of ideas and political 
projects reveals a crisis of the political level and reflects a deep de-
politicisation. The combination of the economic and political crisis creates an 
explosive mixture and provides fertile ground for the well known aphorism that 
all parties and politicians are the same. The legitimacy of the political system is 
seriously challenged as a significant part of the population identifies a 
democratic deficit in the management of the crisis and is confronted with a very 
bleak and worrying image for the future. 
Similar situations in the past have nurtured the rise of extreme forces with 
disastrous results. This however is a remote possibility for the time being. 
History shows that in times of economic crisis societies turn their electoral 
preferences to conservative rather than radical political formations.  In any case 
there is enough evidence to suggest that we are finally close to what can be 
termed the end of the Metapolitefsi (The term used in Greek for the system that 
emerged after the restoration of Democracy in 1974). There are clear signs of 
fatigue of the political forces that dominated the Greek political scene for 35 
years. Their practices, decisions and omissions have been registered in the 
collective social memory, and it is reasonable to assume that this will be 
registered at the forthcoming elections. The most probable result will be the 
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end of the era of the autonomous one-party governments and possibly a 
realignment of the political forces. 
In any case there is enough evidence to suggest that we are finally close to what 
can be termed the end of the Metapolitefsi. There  are clear signs of fatigue of 
the political forces that dominated the Greek political scene for 35 years. Their 
practices, decisions and omissions have been registered in the collective social 
memory, and it is reasonable to assume that this will be registered at the 
forthcoming elections. The most probable result will be the end of the era of the 
autonomous one party governments and possibly a realignment of the political 
forces. 
At the level of virtual reality there are multiple possibilities and various 
political scenarios are possible. The rise of the far right parties in Greece and 
all over Europe poses a worrying prospect. Similarly, the Italian experience is 
not very promising. But predicting and forecasting the future is a job for 
oracles and fortune tellers.  
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